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PROPOSED FISCAL MONITORING
LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Donald H. Elliott*
I. Introduction
Financial management and budgeting are two of the most diffi-
cult and least engaging matters confronting legislators. State legis-
lators often attempt to promote financial stability by requiring
municipalities to adopt budgets that balance anticipated expendi-
tures with estimated revenues. However, this may not be an easy
task for those who govern the municipalities.
Budgeting involves a great deal of guesswork since fiscal policy is
often affected by forces over which local governments exert little, if
any, effective control. For example, an increase in oil prices, a short-
fall in anticipated state aid to education due to an unforeseen drop
in public school enrollment or the onset of a recession may upset
legitimate budget estimates.
Another pitfall of budgetary planning is that political motivations
may lead local officials to overestimate revenues or underestimate
expenditures in order to avoid facing unpleasant fiscal realities.
Elected officials may prefer to run budgetary deficits, financing
such deficits by the issuance of public debt as the alternative to
increasing taxes or cutting services. Indeed, as noted above, even in
politically and financially stable periods, it is difficult to provide for
needed expenditures because of the margin of error inherent in
budget planning.' At times, fiscally Sound budgeting practices may
defeat the long-term interests of a municipality. For instance, mon-
eys earmarked in a budget for major collective bargaining contracts
to be negotiated in that budgetary year will become the starting
point for the negotiators.2
* Partner, Webster & Sheffield. Chairman of the New York Urban Coalition. Formerly
Chairman of the New York City Planning Commission and Counsel to the Mayor of the City
of New York: A.B. Carleton College, LL.B. New York University.
1. See Comment, The Constitutional Debt Limit and New York City, infra at 185.
Comment, Local Finance: A Brief Constitutional History, infra at 135.
2. See generally Oneida County v. Berle, 91 Misc. 2d 694, 398 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Meaney v. City of New Rochelle, 58 A.D.2d 605, 395 N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d Dep't 1977);
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Municipal budget administration would be no less troublesome
for outsiders to manage. Decisions concerning attrition policies re-
garding public employees, the distribution of sanitation services
and the allocation of police and fire protection should be made by
those officials closest to the situation and accountable to the pub-
lic.3
Notwithstanding the difficulties outlined above with respect to
control over local finance, the recent financial difficulties of New
York City, Cleveland and other financially strapped municipalities
demonstrate the need for the preparation and maintenance of bal-
anced budgets and effective monitoring of local budget planning
and administration. The state undoubtedly has a legitimate concern
for the fiscal practices of its localities. Local governments are crea-
tures of state law possessing only those powers delegated by the
state legislature and the constitution.4 Traditionally, states have
attempted to effect balanced budgets by imposing statutory5 and
constitutional' limitations on the power of municipalities to incur
debt. In New York, however, this system did not prevent "massive
deficit financing, uncontrolled issuance of long-term obligations and
even, for a period, default on over a billion dollars in municipal
obligations."7 This occurred through the issuance of permissible
Kotlikoff v. Township of Pennsauken, 131 N.J. Super. 590, 331 A.2d 42 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974).
3. For a thorough discussion of the forces affecting financial management and budgeting
in municipalities see ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL
EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 31-58 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ACIR].
4. Ringlieb v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 59 N.J. 348, 283 A.2d 97 (1971); Board
of Police Comm'rs of New Haven v. White, 171 Conn. 553, 370 A.2d 1070 (1976); United
Tavern Owners of Philadelphia v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 441 Pa. 274, 272 A.2d 868
(1971).
The state may mandate expenditures to be made by a local government. See Bonnet v.
State, 141 N.J. Super. 177, 357 A.2d 772 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Meadowlands Regional
Dev. Agency v. State, 112 N.J. Super. 89, 270 A.2d 418 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 63
N.J. 35, 304 A.2d 545 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991 (1973). A local unit may not tax
unless explicitly given that right. See Salomon v. Jersey City, 12 N.J. 379, 97 A.2d 405 (1953).
The State even has limits on its taxing power. In Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d
273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), the New Jersey Supreme Court declared unconstitu-
tional a system of financing public schools which relied on local taxation and led to great
disparity in dollar input per pupil.
5. See, e.g., N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW §§ 10, 11 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
6. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
7. Committee on Municipal Affairs of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
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debt8 and the creation of public authorities which may contract
indebtedness outside the constitutional debt limit.9
The City Bar Association Committee on Municipal Affairs has
proposed a revision of the existing debt limits, the exclusion in the
New York Constitution of a provision mandating localities to adopt
and maintain balanced budgets and the establishment of a state-
operated fiscal monitoring system to supplement the traditional
approach to budgetary control.'0 This Article will examine the Com-
mittee's proposal in light of the monitoring systems employed in
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. These two states illustrate two types
of state monitoring systems. Pennsylvania imposes reporting re-
quirements upon local governments, but does not permit active
state supervision of local budgetary practices." New Jersey imposes
strict state supervision and control over local budgeting.'2
II. The Pennsylvania and New Jersey Approaches
In Pennsylvania, statewide supervision of local budget adminis-
tration is performed by the Department of Community Affairs.'3
The department is empowered to install a "uniform system of ac-
counts" at the local level of government. 4 However, the statute does
not indicate if this would permit the department to establish a
uniform system of accounting." The department's primary function
Proposals to Strengthen Local Finance Laws in New York State, 34 THE RECORD 58, 83
(Jan./Feb. 1979, No. 1/2) [hereinafter cited as Proposals].
8. The New York Constitution contains many exclusions from the debt limitation; for
example, indebtedness issued in anticipation of taxes and revenue, indebtedness contracted
to provide for the supply of water and indebtedness incurred by the cities of Buffalo, Roches-
ter, Syracuse and New York for enumerated purposes. N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 5, 6, 7, 7a.
9. See Comment, The Constitutional Debt Limit and New York City, infra at 185.
10. One means of controlling local finance is the body of requirements surrounding the
issuance of local debt. Limitations on the power to borrow money may be a most effective
budgetary control. The recommendations of the City Bar Association Committee concerning
disclosure and the issuance of debt will have a profound effect on budget administration. See
Proposals, supra note 7, at 101-05. See also Sigal, The Proposed Constitutional Amendments
to the Local Finance Article: A Critical Analysis, supra at 29; Currier, Mandating Disclosure
in Municipal Securities Issues: Proposed New York Legislation, supra at 67.
11. See notes 13-17 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 17-67 infra and accompanying text.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 339(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
14. Id.
15. "Accounting" may be defined as a "system of making'up or settling accounts."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 36 (4th ed. 1968). In contrast, "accounts" is defined as "a list of
debits and credits." Id. at 34. It may be argued that under the general rule of statutory
1 979]
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is the distribution of forms for budgets and annual reports of munic-
ipalities' financial condition.' 6 The department, however, lacks ex-
plicit statutory authority to confirm the accuracy of these reports
and recommend or compel corrective action. Furthermore, the re-
ports are not audited by independent municipal accountants. Nor
is the department authorized to supervise or control the preparation
and administration of local budgets. The department merely col-
lects and publishes annual reports." In short, Pennsylvania law
construction in Pennsylvania, the power to install a uniform system of accounts does not
permit the department to establish a comprehensive system of accounting. See generally
Note, State Control of Local Government Finances-A Comparative Look at the Pennsyl-
vania System, 81 DICK. L. REv. 575 (1976-1977). Such a construction clearly limits the effec-
tiveness of the statute. Moreover, no penalties are imposed for failure to install a "uniform
system of accounts." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 334 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71 § 339 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
17. Section 339 provides:
The Department of Community Affairs shall have power and its duty shall be:
(a)To prepare, in cooperation with duly authorized committees of local government
officials, and furnish annually at the expense of the Commonwealth, to the corporate
authorities of each county (except counties of the first class), city of the third class,
borough, incorporated town, township, school district of the second, third, and fourth
class blank forms suitable for the making of budgets by the proper authorities of said
local government and for the filing of a copy of the budget after adoption with said
department.
(b)To furnish to the corporate authorities of each county (except counties of the first
class), city of the third class, borough, incorporated town, township suitable blank
forms for the making of annual reports of the financial condition of their respective
local governments to the department, which forms for financial report purposes shall
be placed by said corporate authorities into the hands of the director, controller or
auditors who by law are required to make such financial reports to the department.
Such annual financial reports shall be prepared in cooporation with aforesaid duly
authorized committees of local government officials and shall contain: (1) a statement
of the receipts of the unit of local government from all sources and of all accounts and
revenue which may be due and uncollected at the close of the fiscal year; (2) a state-
ment of the disbursements for all the governmental activities of the unit of local
government during the fiscal year; (3) a detailed statement of the indebtedness of the
unit of local government at the close of the fiscal year, the provisions made for the
payment thereof, together with the purposes for which it was incurred; (4) a statement
of the cost of ownership and operation of each and every public service industry owned,
maintained or operated by the unit of local government; (5) such further or more
specific information in relation to the cost of any branch of the local government and
improvements therein as may be required by the department.
In the case of blank forms for financial reports by townships of the second class and
counties, the same shall be so arranged that corresponding data and information,
required to be reported by said units of local government to the Department of High-
ways or the Department of Public Welfare, may be used for the information required
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adopts a disclosure approach to the control of local budgeting.
A disclosure approach assumes that complete public access to a
municipality's financial information will pressure such municipali-
ties to adopt sound budgeting procedures. The disclosure approach
in Pennsylvania has proved unsuccessful as displayed by the experi-
ence in Darby, Pennsylvania. Notwithstanding the filing of finan-
cial reports for eight years between 1962 and 1970, in September,
1971, Darby officials notified the Pennsylvania Department of Com-
munity Affairs that it was unable to meet its financial obligations
and had decided to put the borough in receivership or bankruptcy., '
New Jersey has implemented a comprehensive state monitoring
system designed to assure fiscal responsibility. In general, New Jer-
sey's approach consists of three complementary statutes: The Local
Budget Law," Chapter 27BB of the State Government Law2 and
to be furnished to the Department of Community Affairs under this section.
Id.
18. ACIR, supra note 3, at 40-41. The Pennsylvania scheme is even further emasculated
by the exclusion of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Scranton from the statutory audit and
financial report requirements. See note 17 supra.
Several other states provide for reporting requirements, but few also impose monitoring and
control requirements. In Connecticut, for example, an annual audit is required. However, the
audit is not subject to state control. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-391 to 7-397 (1979). The audit
required by Connecticut must be "prepared in accordance with the principles and standards
related to accounting, auditing and financial reporting. . . published by the National Com-
mittee on Government Accounting and Audits of State and Local Governmental Units, pub-
lished by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants." Id. § 7-394a. Evidence of
fraud or embezzlement shall be reported to the State's attorney. If an audit is not in accord-
ance with § 7-394, the Secretary must report to the municipality's chief executive and auditor
of public accounts. Id. § 7-395.
Montana is somewhat stricter than Connecticut. A state agency is delegated the power to
"make rules and classifications, and prescribe forms, necessary to carry out the provisions"
of the budget statute and to "define what expenditures are chargeable to each budget ac-
count, and to establish accounting and cost systems necessary to provide accurate budget
information." MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 16-1909 (Supp. 1977); see also MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 11-1401 to 11-1414 (1968 & Supp. 1977).
In Colorado there is both a local government audit law, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1-601 to
29-1-608 (1977 & Supp. 1978), and a Local Government Budget Law, id. §§ 29-1-101 to 29-1-
118 (1977 & Supp. 1978), applying to all subdivisions of the state except home rule cities,
cities and counties. These laws require an annual budget and provide for a budget procedure.
No expenditure may exceed an appropriation which has been budgeted. Accounting princi-
ples are prescribed in the Colorado Local Government Uniform Accounting Law, COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 29-1-501 to 29-1-506 (1977).
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-1 to 40A:4-87 (West Supp. 1979).
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27BB-1 to 52:27BB-66 (West 1955).
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Chapter 27 of the State Government Law.2 The Local Finance
Board in the Division of Local Finance in the Department of Com-
munity Affairs is empowered to enforce the provisions of these stat-
utes.2
The New Jersey Local Budget Law contains detailed require-
ments concerning budget preparation, adoption, amendment and
review. The governing body 3 of a municipality is directed to adopt
a budget on a cash basis2 for each fiscal year.25 The procedure for
adoption of a budget requires the introduction of the proposed
budget in writing and approval by a majority of the governing body,
public advertising of the budget, a public hearing and final approval
by a resolution of the governing body. 6 Revenue estimates for the
proposed budget must be compared to the amounts actually re-
ceived in the preceding fiscal year and the estimated amount to be
received in the current fiscal year to prevent unwarranted optimism
in forecasting projected revenues.27 In addition, the proposed
budget must appropriate funds to close any budget gap for any
deficit which may have developed during the preceding fiscal year. 21
With certain exceptions, 9 the statute imposes a five percent limita-
21. Id. §§ 52:27-1 to 52:27-56.
22. The responsibility for the enforcement of these provisions was transferred to the Divi-
sion of Local Finance from the Division of Local Government in the Department of the
Treasury by a 1966 amendment to the State Government Law. Id. § 52:27D-18 (West Supp.
1979). For a list of the preceding supervisory bodies, see id. §§ 52:27A-1 to 52:27A-18,
52:27A-18.1, 52:27A-19 (West 1955) (Historical Note).
23. Id. § 40A:4-2 (West Supp. 1979).
24. A cash basis budget is defined as:
a budget prepared in accordance with this chapter, and in such form that based on
the limitations, percentages and estimates hereinafter provided there will be sufficient
cash collected to meet all debt service requirements, necessary operations of the local
unit for the fiscal year and, in addition, provide for any mandatory payments required
to be met during the fiscal year.
Id.
25. Id. § 40A:4-3.
26. Id. §§ 40A:4-4 to 40A:4-1. For an application of these statutes, see Donoto v. Essex
County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 146 N.J. Super. 39, 368 A.2d 961 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977).
27. Id. §§ 40A:4-45.3 to 40A:4-45.5.
28. Id. § 40A:4-45.2. See Clark v. Degnan, 163 N.J. Super. 344, 394 A.2d 914 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1978). In Clark, the court was confronted with a situation where the New Jersey
legislature authorized increases of more than five percent to be spent by localities for certain
health and welfare programs. Several localities brought an action for declaratory judgment
in order to avoid the personal responsibility and criminal liability imposed by the statute.
The court held that the five percent limit referred to the overall budget and not to each line
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tion upon annual increases in municipal expenditures. 0 Expendi-
tures are controlled by line item3' and transfers from lines are
strictly limited.2 An expenditure is void if made without an appro-
priation or in excess of the amount appropriated for such purpose
in the budget.33
The Director of the Division of Local Finance is required to exam-
ine a muncipal budget to insure its compliance with the statute."
Upon the Director's certification of approval the governing body
shall adopt a final budget.35 If the Director finds that the statutory
requirements have not been met he is required to refuse to approve
the budget3" and will notify the governing body of the reasons for the
disapproval. The Director may not "substitute his discretion with
respect to the amount of an appropriation when such amount is not
made mandatory because of the requirements of law. ,38 Local offi-
cials must either amend the disapproved budget according to the
and that the mandated expenditures were legitimately within the province of the legislature.
Statutory provisions are made for emergency appropriations. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-46 to
40A:4-55.1 (West Supp. 1979).
29. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-22, 40A:4-32 (West Supp. 1979). Expenditures are compared
against past expenditures for a particular item not against the total budget. "The Local
Budget Law is intended to control municipal expenditures by line item in order to insure that
anticipated revenues equal anticipated expenditures." Kotlikoff v. Pennsauken Township,
131 N.J. Super. 590, 594, 331 A.2d 42, 44 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974).
30. State v. Boncelet, 107 N.J. Super. 444, 258 A.2d 894 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1969).
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-23 (West Supp. 1979) provides, in pertinent part:
In parallel columns to the right of the several items of anticipated revenues, the
following shall be stated:
a. The amounts estimated to be realized from the several items of revenue in the
current fiscal year.
b. The amounts anticipated from the same source in the preceding year.
c. The amounts actually received in cash or realized in accordance with regulations
of the local government board during such preceding year.
32. Id. § 40A:4-42.
33. Id. § 40A:4-57 (West Supp. 1979). "The purpose of this section of the statute
.. .in requiring appropriations in advance of expenditures is to foster sound munici-
pal management of finances by prohibiting undisclosed or irresponsible expenditures." Essex
County Bd. of Taxation v. City of Newark, 73 N.J. 69, 74, 372 A.2d 607, 610 (1977). See
also Manning Eng'r, Inc. v. Hudson County Park Comm'n, 71 N.J. 145, 364 A.2d 1 (1976),
reopened on other grounds, 74 N.J. 113, 376 A.2d 1194 (1977); Monroe County v. City of
Asbury Park, 40 N.J. 457, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A:4-76, 40A:4-77 (West Supp. 1979).
35. Id. § 40A:4-79.
36. Id. § 40A:4-78.
37. Id. § 40A:4-80.
38. Id. § 40A:4-78.
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Director's instructions or petition the Local Government Board for
a hearing. 9 Subsequent to the hearing the governing body may peti-
tion for judicial review.40 The Local Budget Law imposes a personal
fine on the members of the governing body who refuse to comply
with the Director's order unless they seek judicial review.
The budget requirements are complemented by statutory provi-
sions requiring a uniform accounting system, annual audit and the
preparation of an annual financial statement; The Local Finance
Board is directed to prescribe a uniform accounting system for
municipalities.4" The Director is implicitly empowered to compel
reluctant municipalities to comply with state accounting regula-
tions.43 In addition, municipalities must be audited annually by
a registered municipal accountant." The Director of the Local
Finance Board may conduct an audit, at the locality's expense, if
the municipality should fail to comply with the statute. 5 Finally,
the chief financial officer of each local unit must file an annual
financial statement of the financial condition of the local unit as of
the close of the fiscal year.4"
A separate statute47 governs the financial affairs of a financially
39. Id. § 40A:4-81.
40. Id. § 40A:4-82. Notwithstanding this application for judicial review, the governing
body must adopt a budget conforming to the board's determination subject, of course, to the
court's decision. Id.
41. Id. § 40A:4-84. In State v. Boncelet, 107 N.J. Super. 144, 258 A.2d 894 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1964), the court upheld the conviction of a member of the Borough Council of
Carteret and chairman of its finance committee for voting to incur liabilities chargeable to
four line items in the budget in amounts which exceeded the sums appropriated. The court
held that the statute made willful voting of these expenditures a violation of the law without
the necessity to establish a corrupt motive on the defendant's part.
42. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27BB-27 to 52:27BB-34 (West 1955).
43. Id. § 52:27BB-30.
44. Id. §§ 40A:5-4, 40A:5-9 (West Supp. 1979). The Local Fiscal Affairs Law requires
annual audits within five months after the close of a fiscal year and provides a procedure for
the publication of such audit. Id. §§ 40A:5-4 to 40A:5-7. The Local Fiscal Affairs Law, enacted
in 1960, seems to have supplemented and, in part, superseded similar requirements contained
in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-35, 52:27BB-36 (West 1955).
45. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:5-8 (West Supp. 1979). If the director of the Local Finance
Board finds the audit inaccurate, he may order supplementary examinations or direct the
auditing staff of the division to conduct the audit. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27BB-37 (West 1955).
46. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:5-12 (West Supp. 1979). To effectively enforce the aforemen-
tioned statutory provisions, the director may conduct extensive inspections into a locality's
financial affairs. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27BB-46 to 52:27BB-52 (West 1955).
47. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27BB-54 to 52:27BB-100 (West 1955).
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distressed municipality. The Local Finance Board may exercise
significantly more extensive control over local financial practices
where any one of five conditions is shown to exist.' These condi-
tions are: 1) a default in the payment of public debt, 2) overdue
payments of taxes to the State or other agencies, 3) a budget deficit
in excess of five percent of the tax levy for each of the preceding
two years, 4) excessive floating debt, and 5) excessive tax delin-
quency.49 If, after a public hearing, the Local Finance Board con-
cludes that any one of the five conditions exists, state control pro-
visions are put into effect.50 Under these provisions the issuance
of debt is limited,5' the rate of taxation may not be increased by
more than five percent5" and current debt may be liquidated.5 3 In
addition to these measures, the Board may compel the appoint-
ment of an administrator.5" This administrator may exercise such
powers as are assigned by the governing body upon the recommen-
dation of the Local Finance Board,55 including the power to liqui-
date all of a municipality's assets, 5 to act as comptroller5" and to
act as agent of the Board. 8 The application of these provisions
terminates when the condition (or conditions) which activated the
state control is eliminated or the municipality has operated for three
successive years without incurring a cash deficit in excess of five
percentum.59
While the above provisions take effect only upon the initiative of
48. Id. § 52:27BB-55.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 52:27BB-56. Notice of the institution of this state control must be given by
registered mail to the clerk of the municipality. Id.
51. Id. § 52:27BB-57. The section does not limit debt issuance entirely. For example, a
municipality subject to these provisions may issue tax anticipation notes or "other obligations
of a strictly current character." Id.
52. Id. § 52:27BB-58. "This section shall not be construed to authorize an appropriation
of less than the full amount required for the payment of debt service; or to authorize the
abrogation of any covenant entered into with bondholders." Id.
The board may authorize the adoption of a budget in excess of the limitation imposed by
this section under several circumstances, for example, "[tihe protection of the public health,
safety, morals or welfare." Id.
53. Id. § 52:27BB-61.
54. Id. § 52:27BB-80.
55. Id. § 52:27BB-81.
56. Id. § 52:27BB-82.
-57. Id. § 52:27BB-85.
58. Id. § 52:27BB-88. The director of the Local Finance Board may be appointed as
administrator upon resolution by the board. Id. § 52:27BB-90.
59. Id. §§ 52:27BB-91, 52:27BB-64.
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the Local Finance Board other, more drastic emergency measures
may be implemented on the initiative of a municipal bondholder if
a municipality has defaulted in the payment of the principal or
interest of its outstanding bonds. ° If the superior court enters a
judgment declaring the municipality in default for over sixty days,"'
the Municipal Finance Commission" is automatically empowered
to assume responsibility for the fiscal affairs of the defaulting mu-
nicipality. 3 In carrying out its functions, the Municipal Finance
Commission may appoint an auditor 4 to recommend an annual
budget, to review municipal contracts and to make recommenda-
tions concerning capital improvements." Through the Commission,
New Jersey applies the principles of an equity receivership to the
problem of insolvent municipalities."
60. Id. § 52:27-1 to 52:27-66. If these provisions are applicable, the extensive state con-
trols provided for by sections 52:27BB-54 to 52:27BB-100 do not apply. Id. § 52:27BB-65.
Rather than await a lawsuit, a municipality may file a resolution with the superior court
stating that it is unable to meet its obligations as they come due. If the court concurs with
the resolution, it may enter a judgment to that effect. Once the judgment is entered the
Municipal Finance Commission is authorized to function in that municipality. Id. § 52:27-3.
In Rippel v. City of Asbury Park, 118 N.J.L. 45, 48, 190 A. 489, 490 (1937), the supreme
court said:
The statutory scheme was designed to secure, through the agency of the finance com-
mission, a formula for liquidation, as speedily as may be reasonably possible, of the
obligations in default. The commission is charged with the duty of attaining economic
stability, without a cessation of essential municipal function, through a solvent that
will also provide to the unsatisfied creditor every reasonable remedy for the enforce-
ment of his contract. Considerations of public policy, grounded in a sound economy,
ordain that the taxing power shall be reasonably used. Its unbridled exercise ordinarily
frustrates the ultimate purpose, to say nothing of the hardship and loss inflicted upon
the taxpayer, and pushing it to the extreme in an attempt to raise the moneys neces-
sary for the satisfaction of a relatively large indebtedness ofttimes renders the remedy
inefficacious, as well as subversive of the public interest. Such is plainly the genius
of the statute, enacted as an emergency measure.
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-2 (West 1955).
62. When sections 52:27-1 to 57:27-66 are activated, the Local Finance Board becomes the
Municipal Finance Commission. Id. § 52:27-1. See also note 25 supra.
63. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27-2 (West 1955). "Upon the entry of the judgment, the commis-
sion shall have and exercise with respect to such [defaulting] municipality the powers and
duties prescribed by this chapter." Id.
64. Id. § 52:27-6.
65. Id. § 52:27-13.1. The auditor is also given access to all books of accounts, records,
papers and memoranda of the municipality. Id. § 52:27-8. In addition, banking institutions
may not honor the municipality's checks unless countersigned by the auditor. Id. § 52:27-9.
66. "In broad terms, the legislation, through combined administrative and judicial action,
adapted the underlying principles of an equity receivership to the solution of the problem of
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The efficacy of New Jersey's finance laws is illustrated by the
success of Newark in maintaining a sound financial structure. De-
spite its high property tax rate and a state order in 1970 to restore
:$10 million to the public school budget, Newark achieved a bal-
anced budget in fiscal year 1971 with no short-term loans outstand-
ing for operating purposes. 7
III. The Bar's Proposal for Fiscal Monitoring in New York
State
Under existing law, New York State does not closely monitor and
control formulation of local budgets, except in New York City and
Yonkers, where emergency financial control boards have been estab-
lished . 8 In New York State, a municipality is required to submit an
annual report of its financial condition to the comptroller. Failure
to do so is made a misdemeanor and subjects the chief fiscal officer
to certain fines.70 The state comptroller may inspect all accounts of
a municipal corporation as he deems necessary." In addition, cities
and villages are required to file certified copies of their budgets with
insolvent municipalities." Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502,
504 (1942).
In Nevada, the local budget and all amendments thereto must be approved by a state
agency; if the locality fails to enact a budget meeting the state's standards, the power to do
so vests in the state. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 354.524, 354.596, 354.598, 354.599 (1977). If the
locality fails to pass a proper budget, the last year's budget adjusted by the State Department
of Taxation becomes the budget. Id. § 354.598. Each locality must submit quarterly reports
showing performance against budget. Id. § 354.602. There are detailed provisions to correct
conditions of financial difficulty in local government, involving a new financial plan and
controls over revenues and expenses. Id. §§ 354.650-354.720. Financial difficulty is defined
as a default on a debt payment or inability to meet two consecutive payrolls or a qualified or
adverse audit. Id. § 354.660. The State Department of Taxation can require certain stringent
actions, (e.g., withholding of state and local tax distributions from the locality until a local
government financing plan is adopted by the local government and approved by the Depart-
ment), after a hearing before the State Board of Finance at which the Department and the
locality are represented. Id. Finally, in Nevada, if a local government fails to comply with a
departmental order, the district court can compel compliance. Id. § 354.690.
67. ACIR, supra note 3, at 45-46.
68. See 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 869 (New York); 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 488 (Yonkers). See also
Proposals, supra note 7, at 102.
69. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 30(1) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1978).
70. Id. § 30(5).
71. Id. § 30(1). Power is delegated to the comptroller to compel the appearance and
attendance of any person whose testimony may be required to understand the financial affairs
of a municipal corporation. Id. § 34(1).
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the comptroller. 2 The failure of this approach is evidenced by New
York City's fiscal crisis in the mid-1970's. 73
The proposed fiscal monitoring legislation recommended by the
Committee resembles the monitoring system of New Jersey, but is
not as stringent. The Committee's proposal seeks to spare local
control from excessive state intervention. without sacrificing the
state's interest in fiscal conservatism. The heart of the proposal is
the requirement that municipalities adopt and maintain balanced
budgets.74 The monitoring procedures are designed to enforce this
requirement. The Committee did not attempt to precisely define a
"balanced budget. ' 75 Instead, the state comptroller is authorized to
determine if local budgets are balanced in accordance with account-
ing principles promulgated by the comptroller's office."6
Under the proposed legislation, compliance with the balanced
budget requirement is monitored and enforced under a three-stage
monitoring mechanism. The first stage requires all municipal and
district corporations to submit copies of planned budgets and an-
nual financial statements to the comptroller.77 If, after reviewing
these documents, the comptroller determines that a municipality is
experiencing financial difficulties, it is placed under closer state
scrutiny in the second stage. The ailing municipality is then re-
quired to submit quarterly financial statements and operating re-
ports to the comptroller °.7 If the comptroller finds that the locality
has violated the law with respect to the balanced budget require-
ment or the issuance of municipal obligations, he may advise local
officials of necessary remedial action.'" The comptroller, however,
72. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54a (McKinney 1974).
73. See Comment, The Constitutional Debt Limit and New York City, infra at 183. See
also Proposals, supra note 7, at 75-80.
74. PROPOSED LOCAL FINANCE ARTICLE, § 5, Proposals, supra note 7, at 113 (reprinted in
Appendix A).
75. Balanced Budget is described as a budget wherein "total revenues [equal or exceed]
total expenditures." PROPOSED FISCAL MONITOR LEGISLATION, § 1, Proposals, supra note 7, at
120 (reprinted in Appendix C).
76. Proposals, supra note 7, at 64-65.
77. PROPOSED FISCAL MONITOR LEGISLATION, § 2, Proposals, supra note 7, at 120-21 (re-
printed in Appendix C).
78. Id. at 121.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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may not impose a budget upon the municipality.' He must bring
suit against the municipality to compel compliance. 2
In the final stage, a financially distressed municipality may face
complete state control when its financial predicament portends fi-
nancial disaster. 3 This stage of the monitoring system is intention-
ally broad and undefined. The Committee rejected the inclusion of
a statutory provision mandating the establishment of an emergency
financial control board when fiscal crisis is at hand." Instead, the
comptroller is required to deliver annual reports to the legislature
concerning fiscally insecure municipalities.85 Presumably, it is in-
tended that the state legislature take such as hoc action as is neces-
sary to correct the problem.
This ad hoc approach is defective in that it fails to account for
the political pressures which accompany legislative action. Auto-
matic corrective measures which do not depend upon future legisla-
tive will are needed.
Although the monitoring function given the comptroller under the
Committee's proposal is adequately comprehensive, complemen-
tary enforcement powers are lacking. The comptroller must apply
to the court in order to compel compliance with the monitoring
legislation. This is in contrast to New Jersey's provision wherein
the Local Finance Board need not go to court to compel compliance
with the statute.88 In this respect, the Committee's proposal may
impose a difficult, time consuming, and inappropriate role upon the
judiciary. The proposed enforcement provision provides:
[t]he comptroller may proceed, in his own name by suit, action or proceed-
ing, at law or in equity, to require such corporation to comply with the
applicable requirements of law .... In any such suit, action or proceeding,
the actions taken by such corporation shall be upheld if the court determines
81. Id. In Nevada, if a locality fails to adopt a budget complying with state standards,
the state may impose a budget upon a locality. See note 66 supra.
82. PROPOSED FISCAL MONITORING LEGISLATION, § 2, Proposals, supra note 7, at 121 (re-
printed in Appendix C).
83. Proposals, supra note 7, at 47.
84. Id. at 45.
85. PROPOSED FISCAL MONITOR LEGISLATION, § 4, Proposals, supra note 7, at 122 (reprinted
in Appendix C).
86. Proposals, supra note 7, at 104.
87. See text accompanying notes 50-62 supra.
88. See notes 19-66 supra and accompanying text.
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that there exists substantial evidence to support such corporation's determi-
nation that its actions comply with the requirements of law."
This provision would require a court to review the financial prac-
tices of municipalities with multi-million dollar budgets. The court
would be required to act as a large judicial accounting board. In
Wein v. Carey,90 the New York Court of Appeals expressed its reluct-
ance to take on such a role. In Wein, a taxpayer claimed that the
state had violated the constitutional balanced budget requirement
during fiscal year 1976-1977.11 In rejecting plaintiffs argument that
given two successive annual deficits the state should carry the bur-
den of proving its good faith attempt to maintain a balanced
budget, the court observed:
[a]ssuming it were feasible to convert a courtroom into a super-auditing
office to receive and criticize the budget estimates of a State with an $11
billion budget, the idea is not only a practical monstrosity but would dupli-
cate what the Legislature and Governor do together . . . each year.2
IV. Conclusion
In the face of political realities in New York, the Committee's
proposal is an important step forward, but it is only the first step.
The proposals would be improved by replacing the judicial enforce-
ment provision with an administrative procedure. The comptroller's
recommended remedial actions should be evaluated at an adminis-
trative hearing. This procedure would give the municipality an op-
portunity to be heard and would guard against arbitrary decisions
by a single political office. It would also be appropriate to have a
standby financial control board that the comptroller could convene
if his suggestions for action are ignored by the locality. New York
State already has two Emergency Financial Control Boards in oper-
ation and is familiar with the procedure they follow. The financial
control board would make the decision whether to take jurisdiction
and, if so, direct the locality to take appropriate action.
89. PROPOSED FISCAL MONITOR LEGISLATION, § 5, Proposals, supra note 7, at 123 (reprinted
in Appendix C).
90. 41 N.Y.2d 498, 362 N.E.2d 587, 393 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1977).
91. Id. at 503, 362 N.E.2d at 590, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
92. Id. at 504-05, 362 N.E.2d at 591, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 960. Judicial review of the procedure
of budget formulation is similarly difficult. See Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 378 N.E.2d
95, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1978).
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